

# **EXHIBIT 14**

**modern**

# **Industrial Organization**

**Second Edition**

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# CONTENTS

## PREFACE xi

## PART 1 INTRODUCTION 1

## 1 OVERVIEW 2

### Models 2

*Price Theory / Transaction Costs / Game Theory / Contestable Markets*

### Organization 6

*Basic Theory / Market Structures / Business Practices: Strategies and Conduct / Information, Advertising, and Disclosure / Dynamic Models and Market Clearing / Government Policies and Their Effects*

## PART 2 BASIC THEORY 13

## 2 THEORY OF THE FIRM 14

### The Objective of a Firm 15

### Transaction Costs and Vertical

### Mergers 17

*Transaction Costs and Opportunistic Behavior / High Transaction Costs / Monitoring Costs / Motivating Workers*

### Organization Within Firms 25

*Hierarchies / Internal Organization of Large Firms*

### Ownership and Control 28

*Forms of Ownership / Separation of Ownership and Control*

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that du Pont lacked market power because, at the time, the market for cellophane had many substitutes, such as paper and other materials. However, the market including these substitutes was not large. However, that price substantially exceeded marginal cost. In the discussion, it was an error to include other wrapping materials in the market because they did not prevent the exercise of market power by the price of cellophane to competitive levels. If, in fact, du Pont had market power, the Court had investigated whether it could raise the cellophane price, however, its market power was appropriate.

Therefore, the Supreme Court articulated a laundry list of factors to define markets.<sup>14</sup> It said: "The boundaries of such markets are defined by examining such practical indicia as industry or product, market as a separate economic entity, the product's characteristics, unique production facilities, distinct customers, price changes, and specialized vendors." The application of these criteria has not led to precision in defining a market.

Used to identify the good substitutes for a particular product, producers in the industry who presumably know their potential competitors from other industries. If they are in the same economic market, then their prices move together. Therefore, a reasonable first step in defining a market is to examine the price correlations (a statistical measure of the relationship between the prices of different products that are under the same product market).<sup>16</sup>

Levels of correlation have been established to determine whether products are in the same market. For example, suppose that everybody agrees that elastic materials are in the same economic market. The relationship between their prices and use it as a benchmark to determine whether a third plastic material belongs in the same economic market.

See, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).

Defining economic markets, have occasionally attempted to define markets within an economic market. Presumably competition between products in the same market is more intense if the two products also belong to the same market and the relationship between market and submarket is not very useful, and we do not give an economic definition of the term submarket.

A step in defining markets; however, high correlations need not always indicate that products are in the same market. For example, dissimilar products made of the same material have price correlations. Similarly, low correlations need not always indicate that products are in the same market provided large quantity shifts accompany the price of a good substitute does not, and the price of a good substitute sharply declines.

The direct price elasticity—~~not~~ the cross-elasticity of demand—determines market power. The cross-elasticity of demand is the percentage change in quantity demanded in response to a 1 percent change in another product's price. There is a lot of discussion in court decisions as to the importance of cross-elasticity of demand in defining markets. Courts often use the term loosely to indicate that products are substitutes. There is a relationship between cross-elasticity and direct elasticity, however. All else the same, the larger a cross-elasticity of demand, the larger in absolute value is the direct elasticity of demand.<sup>17</sup>

To intelligently discuss a cross-elasticity, one must specify whether it is the cross-elasticity of Product A with respect to the price of Product B or vice versa. Although these two different cross-elasticities are usually not distinguished in court decisions, they are not equal in general.<sup>18</sup> The relevant cross-elasticity of demand when the question is whether the market for Product A should include Product B is the cross-elasticity of demand for Product A with respect to the price of Product B.

**The Extent of the Geographic Market.** The geographic limit of a market is determined by answering the question of whether an increase in price in one location substantially affects the price in another. If so, then both locations are in the same market. The process of determining these limits proceeds along the same lines as discussed for the product market definition and involves similar reasoning. For example, consider the consumption of oranges in Chicago. Oranges are shipped to Chicago from outside the city limits. The geographic areas that ship to Chicago (or could profitably do so if price rose slightly) are in the same economic market as Chicago because they contain orange producers whose output significantly influences the price of oranges in Chicago. Notice that these same orange producers could also significantly affect the price of oranges in Milwaukee. Thus Milwaukee and Chicago would be in the same economic market, and the price of oranges in Chicago would generally be closely related to the price of oranges in Milwaukee.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup>This result follows because the sum of the direct elasticity plus all cross-elasticities of demand equals 0. Let the cross-elasticity of demand of Product A with respect to the price of Product B be  $\epsilon_{AB} = \frac{\partial Q_A}{\partial p_B} \frac{p_B}{Q_A}$ , where  $Q_A$  is the (income-compensated) demand for A, and  $p_B$  is the price of B. Then,  $0 = \epsilon_{AA} + \sum_B \epsilon_{AB}$ , where  $\epsilon_{AA}$  is the own (direct) price elasticity of demand for product A.

(Henderson and Quandt 1980, 31-3). The cross-elasticity of demand is positive for substitutes, and the direct price elasticity is negative. The direct elasticity can be large even if no individual cross-elasticity is large.

<sup>18</sup>From demand theory,  $\frac{\partial Q_A}{\partial p_B} = -\frac{\partial Q_B}{\partial p_A}$ . This last relationship does not imply that the cross-elasticities of demand (defined in the previous footnote)  $\epsilon_{AB}$  and  $\epsilon_{BA}$  are equal (Henderson and Quandt 1980, 30).

<sup>19</sup>See Landes and Posner (1981), Scheffman and Spiller (1987), and Stigler and Sherwin (1985) for further analysis of market definition.